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The "Making" of the Navajo Worker: Navajo
Households, the Bureau ofIndian Affairs, and OffReservation Wage Work, 1948-1960
COLLEEN O'NEILL

Arizona employers each year spend many thousands of
dollars importing foreign and domestic workers, when in
fact, we have within our backyard a very substantial number of resident Indian workers who should be used. The
problem of getting the Indian to accept the White Man's
way ofliving will be most difficult, but in several instances,
it has been proven in agriculture, mining and lumbering,
that over a period of a few years' time a transformation
can be effected which is beneficial to both employer and
the Indian.
-Arizona State Employment Service, 1948 1

In 1939, thirteen-year-old Clarence Kee boarded a truck bound

for the carrot fields near Phoenix, Arizona, nearly 350 miles southwest of his home on theNavajo Reservation. Even so young, the
Navajo teenager sensed that hardships lay before him. After his
father's death, his mother and seven siblings had supported the
family by raising sheep, selling wool at the trading post, weaving
what was left into rugs, and working at any odd jobs they could
find. Even attendance at a school near Fort Defiance fell by the
wayside. With his father gone, Kee's mother needed her seven- .
year-old son at home. As Kee recalled, "she wanted me to take
care of the sheep, all my life.'?
Colleen O'Neill is assistant professor of ethnic studies at California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo. She is currently writing a history of
twentieth-century Navajo labor.
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As history would have it, Kee's mother got her wish, but not
in the way that she might have imagined. When Kee climbed into
the back of that pickup truck six years later, the full-time task of
herding sheep would be over. After those carrot fields, Kee
worked on a railroad section gang, a job that took him far from
his mother's flocks to California, Oregon, and Nebraska for six
weeks at a time. Yet familial responsibilities, such as caring for
his mother's sheep and tending to some of her other needs, always pulled him back to the reservation. Employed by the railroad until 1948, Kee returned to work in a coal mine near his
family's home, ending his days as a migrant worker. Other family
members, however, including his wife and children, would continue to work at seasonal jobs into the 1960s. As Kee's mother
had wished, they continued to raise sheep. But it was wage work
that provided the family with the resources they needed to maintain their small flock and resist permanent migration off the reservation.
Historians and anthropologists have long assumed that federal stock reduction policies and World War II transformed Navajos into wageworkers.' The federal government's actions and
the lure of defense jobs provided compelling external influences
that drew Navajos away from the reservation, at least temporarily. Focusing on those variables alone, however, tells us little
about why so many people stayed and how they managed to resist such powerful forces." A closer look at the dynamic negotiations between Navajos, the federal government, and Southwestern
employers reveals a much more complicated story.
Beginning in the 1930s, partly as a result of declining wool
prices and federally enforced livestock reduction, Navajos became increasingly dependent on wages to survive. At that time,
Navajos relied on wages for 30 percent of their income. By the
1960s, they were drawing 60 percent of their household income
from wages.' The federal government played an important role
ushering in this transition. In the 1930s, officials from the Bureau
of Indian Affairs (BIA) and the Soil Conservation Service decided to reduce Navajo livestock herds by 50 percent. They be~
lieved overgrazing had depleted the range to such an extent that
the future of livestock on the reservation was in question. One
consequence of that program was a sharpening of class lines on
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the reservation. Navajos with the largest flocks couldmaintain
their sheep-centered households, while those who drew their subsistence from smaller flocks had to find other ways to survive."
For those with fewer head, like the Kee family, Great Depression-era conditions, drought, and federal stock reduction policies made it nearly impossible to make a living raising sheep and
working the land. Only those reservation households located in
nearly inaccessible areas, cut off by difficult terrain and poor
roads, could resist the lure of the capitalist market. Navajo families like the Kees survived by selectively engaging in the capitalist market as wage earners, producers, and consumers. Most pooled
their income from a variety of sources, including the wages they
earned working on the railroad, herding others' sheep, or selling
rugs and other craft items.
Following World War II, BIA officials set their sights on Navajo labor-market behavior. They were still concerned about the
carrying capacity of the reservation, but rather than further limit
the number of sheep, the agency instead decided to reduce the
people living on the land. Federal Indian policy was shifting in the
postwar era. Policies that favored termination of Indian reservations were now the rule in Congress, and for N avaj os that meant
a variety of voluntary relocation programs. BIA representatives
were particularly interested in stopping the return migration of
many Navajos who had left the reservation to find wage work.
Officials attempted to create off-reservation settlements that
would function as labor colonies, providing commercial growers
with a permanent, year-round workforce. The BIA hoped Navajos would be drawn to these communities, leaving behind, once
and for all, the homes and responsibilities that had once brought
them back to the reservation.
Wage work did not remake Navajo culture in the way that the
BIA and Southwestern employers imagined. Many Navajos withstoodBIA efforts to relocate them permanently in off-reservation labor colonies. They insisted on keeping their homes on the
reservation and adjusting their wage-work practices so they could
continue to meet their household obligations. While the labor market may have pulled Navajo men and, in some cases, their families away from the reservation, they nevertheless continued to
contribute to a household economy. Instead of laboring in their
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wives' fields and tending their flocks, men working off the reservation contributed their wages to the household, returning home
sporadically to fulfill kin-based obligations. Thus, wage work did
not make Navajos into white-defined workers, but rather it required them to negotiate between often conflicting culturally defined perceptions of work, gender roles, household responsibility,
and options created by the global market.
For Southwestern employers, the Navajos appeared to offer
an attractive labor pool. To pull them successfully into the labor
market, commercial farmers, mining companies; and other Western industrialists had to adjust to Navajos' demands and figure
out ways to accommodate their culturally defined work practices.
BIA officials, reduced to little more than labor contractors, failed
to reshape Navajo migratory behavior in the ways they had intended. As they navigated the pull of the market and the push of
the state, Navajos located new ways to make a living; they found
work consistent with their values of communalism and kinship and
endeavored to contribute to the survival of the reservation household in whatever form it might take in the post-stock-reduction
era.
The Navajo case suggests economic development in the American Southwest between the 1930s and 1960 was a fluid process,
one that shaped and was shaped by local systems of power and
culture specific to the region. This story counters the classic
modernization tale, which assumes that as soon as indigenous
peoples encounter the capitalist market, their cultural traditions
erode and subsistence economies decay. The Navajos negotiated
the encroaching world market selectively, participating in it when
it suited their purposes, but refusing to allow capitalist cultural
and economic logic to significantly undermine the basic premises
upon which they had shaped these new economic strategies.
Certainly American Indians suffered tremendously as they
were drawn into the market economy. The Navajos were no exception. The U.S: government attacked Navajo subsistence as a
military strategy in 1863. The military destroyed reservation crops
and livestock and subsequently attempted to remake Navajos into
sedentary farmers while they were being held in captivity at the
Bosque Redondo. Seventy years later and well within the living
memory of the "Long 'Walk," the BIA enforced draconian mea-
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sures to reduce the Navajo livestock herds, a policy that helped
to undermine their mixed subsistence household economies.
Despite-or perhaps because of-these direct assaults on their
livelihoods, the Navajos consistently created new ways of making a living within the expanding U.S. economy that were distinctly their own. They participated in the "reworking of modernity"
in their region, strategically weaving an alternative history of capitalist development that was as culturally specific as the patterns
in a Navajo rug." That process, while painful and difficult, involved, to use William Roseberry and Jay O'Brien's words, "new
expressions of cultural difference as well as fundamental redefinitions of old ones.""

The Reservation Labor System
Navajos worked for wages long before World War II. Some served
as scouts for the U.S. Army in the campaign against the Apaches
in the 1870s. Many Navajos were common laborers on Soil Conservation Service projects, as miners in agency-operated coal
mines, and as interpreters at other BIA administrative facilities.
From the turn of the century onward, those Navajos with few
sheep to tend became extra-gang track laborers for the Santa Fe
Railroad or traveled to Colorado to find employment in the sugar
beet fields."
Before 1948, Navajos found jobs through a variety of networks. Culturally defined internal hierarchies on the reservation
had emerged in response to the encroaching U.S. economy. Traders played a central role in thisunfolding process. Since the turn
of the century, they had acted as the front-line arbitrators of the
capitalist market for the N avaj os, buying wool, advancing credit,
and supplying them with consumer goods. As it became more difficult for Navajos to produce for the market, the traders assumed
the role of quasilabor contractors for the railroads and other offreservation employers who were recruiting Navajo laborers.
The trading post offered railroad officials a central place to
distribute information about job openings. Recruiters valued the
traders' knowledge of Navajo culture and relied on their recommendations to fill their job orders. Traders eagerly promoted railroad work because it was seasonal and Navajos would usually
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bring their wages back to the reservation to spend on goods at
the trading posts. The railroads also offered unemployment benefits to Navajo workers in the winter, assuring them a continued
cash income during the months when they had previously depended
on credit from the trader.'?
Other industries sought out Navajo elites to act as gobetweens. In fact, leading Navajos began to challenge the prominence of the trader in negotiating their kinsmen's experience in
the wage labor market. For example, during World War II, the
Phelps Dodge Corporation approached Howard Gorman, a prominent Navajo .leader from Ganado, to bring two hundred men to
work in the copper mines in Morenci, Arizona." Another tribal
council member from Crownpoint recruited workers from his area
to work in the notorious farm labor camps in Bluewater, New
Mexico.P
After World War II, returning veterans and defense workers
became an additional layer of cultural brokers. According to one
observer, they were "up to date men who knew their way around
the white world."'" They were part of a new generation of Navajo men and women who, in the 1950s, would challenge the "old
guard" of Navajo politics by questioning the authority of an elite
who derived power from large livestock holdings, relationships
with the traders, and an ability to exploit the labor of their extended families."
World War II brought relief from the suffering associated with
stock reduction, drawing thousands of Navajo men and women
off the reservation to serve in the armed forces and to work in
defense-related industries. Like other minority groups, they took
advantage of the wartime labor shortage and migrated to reservation border towns and cities like Los Angeles, Phoenix, Albuquerque, and Denver, where they found jobs that would have been
closed to them before the war. IS Navajos were not the only Native Americans to take advantage of the weakening color line in
the industrial. labor market. American Indians throughout the
United States wanted good jobs and livable wages and traveled
great distances to get them. As a result, the war inspired the first
massive rriigration of American Indians off the reservations in
the twentieth century. 16 According to Alison Bernstein, in 1944
alone, more than forty-four thousand Native Americans left home
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in search of off-reservation employment. Out of that number,
twenty-four thousand found work in non-agricultural jobs. Approximately 25 percent of that total were Navajos."
Some Navajos found new opportunities serving in the armed
forces. IS The military provided a kind of occupational training
ground where Navajo soldiers gained skills they found useful in
the postwar labor market. For example, in 1942 Myrtle Waybenais
left her position as an instructional aid at a BIA day school in
Shiprock to join the Women's Army Corps. In a medical course,
she learned, "about food and diets" and at a hospital technical
school she studied "the fields of being a nurse."19
After 1948, the BIA set out to undermine the reservation labor system, determined to challenge the role of the traders, the
railroads, and informal recruitment practices initiated by a few
Navajo elites. Such strategies had allowed Navajo workers to dip
into the wage market for a limited time and then return to maintain their reservation households. Similar to the way they had attempted to rationalize sheep production, BIA officials were hoping
to gain control of Navajo wage-labor practices as well.

Stabilizing the Navajo Work Force
BIA officials worried that veterans and war workers would place
an unbearable strain on already limited reservation resources when
they returned home after the war. In an alarmist. tone, they concluded that the land simply could not support them. The officials
predicted that "30,000 Navajos need to find a way to live outside
the reservation or by some other means than sheep raising and
the meager farming available.'?" Congress commissioned a study,
later known as "the Krug Report," in an effort to find solutions to
these problems and assess the reservation's potential for economic development.
The 1950 Navajo-Hopi Rehabilitation Act, the bill designed to
implement the study's findings, was supposed to offer solutions.
Sponsors of that legislation allocated $88,570,000 towards this
effort and hoped federally financed improvements would boost
the reservation economy. Indeed, that investment laid the groundwork for a developing infrastructure. Paved roads, electricity, and
telephone lines were essential to attract large-scale industry. This
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type of development, however, would not necessarily create a
dynamic internal economy on the reservation. It connected the
Navajo reservation to external markets, but it did not provide
N avaj os with the capital they needed to create their own local
enterprises.
'
.
The program embodied contradictory goals. On the one hand,
it was supposed to improve the reservation economy and provide
relief to the Navajo people who lived in terrible poverty. On the
other, instead of helping to create a vital reservation working class
to participate in the development of an internal economy, the program encouraged workers who were at the height of their productive years to leave the reservation for good." BIA officials
set out to transform reservation labor practices because they were
convinced that Navajo migratory behavior reinforced the Indians'
connection to the reservation, a problem that undermined their
eventual assimilation into the white world. Encouraging permanent off-reservation relocation would ease the demand on reservation resources and facilitate Navajo incorporation into the
mainstream American economy."
According to BIA estimates, demand for Navajo labor exceeded supply. In 1948, Indian Service officials reported that approximately ten thousand Navajos were available for
off-reservation wage work, a number that barely met the demand
for their labor the year before (see Table 1). Their relatively large
numbers, access to regional commercial agriculture, and availability suggested an alternative source of cheap labor to replace
Mexican nationals and other migrant laborers. The BIA, members of the Navajo Tribal Council, and representatives of Western industries now had to figure out how to bring Navajo workers
to that market, and, most important, how to make them stay.
Part of that plan meant imposing gender. roles that were the
norm in the surrounding U.S. economy. An in-depth analysis of
the gendered implications of theBIA's relocation plan is beyond
the scope of this article. However, the criteria they used to define potential workers offers a revealing glimpse of the significant role gender played in the BIA's attempts to shape the Navajo
working class. The BIA estimated that there was a total of sixteen thousand men between the ages of fifteen and sixty-five living on the reservation, 6,350 of whom were not available for work
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Table 1: Available Off-Reservation Employment, 1948. 23

because they were either attending school, physically incapacitated, employed, or self-supporting: Fewer women could be considered potential workers because of their "family ties." BIA
officials did not list "family ties" to explain why men might not be
prepared to join the wage labor market. In addition, "self-supporting" was a category they only applied to men, although we
know that women significantly contributed to the household
economy by weaving rugs and selling sheep and wool as well as
working for wages on and off the reservation. Since most N avajos at this time pooled their resources and valued women's work
as crucial for household survival, it appears that the BIA's criteria were less an actual assessment of the Navajo labor market
than a prescription for what they hoped it would become."
In January 1948, James M. Stewart, the general superintendent of the N avaj 0 Reservation outlined a philosophy consistent
with federal -assimilationist goals, offering a proposal that would
guide the BIA's efforts to shape the Navajo labor market. He
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modeled his plan on how he imagined immigrant communities
coped with an unfamiliar and often hostile American cultural environment. In Stewart's eyes, European and Asian immigrants had
established neighborhoods that cushioned their arrival with familiar cultural surroundings and simultaneously offered them an avenue for assimilation into the American mainstream. Chinatowns
and little Italys, "offered points of departure from which the individual and his children could learn the language and customs of
America and ultimately assume his place in our national life."
Ethnic neighborhoods drew immigrants to them and provided
"training grounds for the new arrivals from the old country.'?"
He hoped that the new Navajo "colonies" would serve the same
purpose. They would supply employers with labor and, in Stewart's
words, "rehabilitate" the Navajo people.
Unlike the Navajos, the Chinese and the Europeans lived "too
far away to permit them to return as an escape from nostalgia or
frustration." As a result, "they were faced with [the] necessity
of creating a familiar environment in the midst of the unfamiliar."
Because Navajos could return home at any time, the challenge,
according to BIA officials, was to make these off-reservation
communities an attractive alternative to life on the reservation."
Thus, colonization would break the connection that pulled so many
back to the reservation and create a reliable work force for Western employers. Such a plan resonated well with the federal termination agenda."
For BIA officials and some Western employers, Navajo culture was a problem that needed to be solved. Stewart noted that
the Navajos "subscribe to a way oflife, a pattern of thinking, and
a system of values which are highly divergent from our own." He
knew that transforming those cultural ideas would not be an easy
task. He noted that the "customs, institutions, and other characteristics which serve to distinguish one way of life from another
are not things which can be shed and replaced at will." Thus,
Stewart concluded, any program that the BIA implemented had
to address Navajo cultural practices that tended to draw them
back to the reservation. He assumed that a continued connection
to the reservation household interfered with Navajos' eventual
assimilation into the white world of permanent wage labor. Severing those connections was the only answer for insuring the sue-
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cess of the colonization proj ect. 28 Hence, BIA officials launched
an all-out battle to transform N avaj 0 ideas and expectations about
work and household responsibilities. With stock reduction, the BIA
had intruded into Navajo households and undermined their subsistence base. Now, BIA officials were attempting to control how
the Navajos engaged the wage labor market.
The BIA did not wait long to implement Stewart's plan. On 30
January 1948, two days after Stewart released his report, William
H. Zeh, director of the BIA's District IV, convened a meeting to
discuss off-reservation employment for the Navajo and Hopi
people. Attending the meeting were representatives from railroad
and lumber companies, commercial agriculture, and traders with
operations on the Navajo and Hopi reservations. Placement officials from the Arizona and New Mexico employment services
represented the state governments. Also in attendance were various federal bureaucrats from the Department of the Interior, the
Navaj 0 and Hopi agencies, and the Veterans Administration. Thirteen Navajo leaders attended to comment on working conditions
in industries that employed Indian labor. 29
Six days later, at a meeting of the Farm Labor Advisory Committee in Arizona, Zeh explained to commercial growers what had
transpired at the Phoenix conference. He summarized the conclusions, reporting that the participants confirmed the need for a
stabilized Navajo labor force. The challenge they faced was how
to "keep them on the job longer." He invited employers and BIA
officials to "encourage [the Navajo worker] to become an established workman, established in the community and available to
work in whatever type of work his capacities, his limitations, or
his strength qualifies him for." He laid out the problems that he
thought would face all parties involved in off-reservation colonization. Stressing that Navajos were willing to seek off-reservation employment, he acknowledged to his audience that it would
be a challenge for the employers and the Indian Service to encourage permanent migration. The problem, according to Zeh, was
that for Navajos, "[t]here is a very strong tie to the reservation.
The Navajo is in general a primitive sort of individual, the wide
world is a foreign world to him, he doesn't feel any happier than
we would feel in the Navajo world." In rather paternalistic terms,
Zeh encouraged the growers· to empathize with the Navajo work-
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ers' situation, reassuring them that, in time, the Indians would
adjust.
You can see what a difficult situation the Indian has to
meet off-hand to adjust to white man's civilization. It will
take a period of time under certain conditions, and the primary condition will be right treatment, and then he will
respond quite well .... In general, the Navajo has been
found to be a desirable employee. The comments made
which were adverse to the Navajo were primarily directed
to his habit of leaving the job and going back to the reservation. That is something that education will take care of.
60 to 80 years ago, the Navajo was a primitive savage.
He has come a very long way in a short time. According
to our standards, he will have to learn about work habits
before he becomes a first class employee of any kind. 30
According to Zeh, Navajos had to adapt to "modern" workplace practices. Employers, too, had some lessons to learn. They
could improve their success with Navajo workers if they made an
effort to understand their culture. He noted:
problems created by language and tribal customs . . .
[would] be solvable through sympathetic understanding and
education of the Indian and the white employer. It is not
only necessary for the Navajo to learn, but the white employer must learn about the Navajo."
After holding a series of meetings with interested employers
and consulting officials from state employment agencies, the bureau enacted a pilot project to facilitate the creation of off-reservation communities. The BIA established the Navajo Placement
Service in the spring of 1948 to secure off-reservation employment, primarily in agricultural and extra-gang railroad work." The
employers or state employment officers would file job orders with
the Navajo Placement Service, and it would send them suitable
employees. The success of the program, according to BIA representatives, required both educating the employers about Navajo
cultural values and teaching Navajos how to behave on the job.

386

O'NEILL

OCTOBER 1999

The BIA, in conjunction with state employment services in Arizona, Colorado, Utah, and California, would coordinate this exchange, protecting the Navajos from exploitation and at the same
time offering to industry workers who were reliable and suited to
the task.
Agency officials circulated a calendar that outlined what they
understood as the important events that marked the Navajo year
in an effort to educate potential employers about the types of
cultural and familial commitments that might lure Navajo workers
back to the reservation. They explained that from June through
September, Navajos would be preoccupied with cultivating their
fields and from mid-September through mid-October, they would
be leaving work periodically to harvest them. March, April, and
May would find many Navajos working on spring planting, ·tending to new lambs, and shearing mature sheep. Herding, of course,
was a responsibility that would draw Navajos home year-round
when they were needed. The brochure warned employers that
the demands of the reservation household would draw employees
back home, particularly in the fall, when the pinon crop was ready
for harvesting."
Additionally, the Colorado Department of Economic Security
informed employers ·of spiritual and other cultural events in the
Navajo calendar. The Shiprock fair, held at the end of September,
the Pow Wow in Flagstaff on July 4th, and the Gallup Ceremonial
in late summer were specific events that encouraged Navajos to
gravitate away from their jobs. The Yeibichai was held in October, November, and December and other Navajo ceremonies, such
as· "squaw" dances, took place in August and September. 34 In the
winter, other household demands limited the availability of Navajos to take jobs off the reservation. Those who had children in
school on the reservation were reluctant to leave. Men returned
home in the fall to make sure their families had enough firewood
to get them through the coldest months. According to the employment service, understanding these rituals and responsibilities would
improve the employers' relationship with their Navajo employees.
Representatives of the BIA's Navajo Service suggested that
employers designate English-speaking Navajo men as work group
leaders. They could interpret the terms of employment and ex-
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plain the requirements of the job to their fellow Navajo workers. 35 At the Phoenix conference, employers had offered their experience of how successful such a setup could be. John C. Church,
a vegetable grower near Phoenix, testified that he always hired
Navajos who were bilingual in English and Navajo. As a result,
he did not "find the language problem too serious." He explained'
that he would "pick out leaders from different districts and make
them road bosses. All these road bosses speak very good English
and they convey our messages. "36
Some farmers were not as 'lucky as Church and found out
that an interpreter's loyalty did not always favor management. In
November 1948, on the Harmon Crismon Farms in Queen Creek,
Arizona, a Navajo man named Earl Johnson used his leverage as
a go-between to bargain for higher wages and better living conditions for the other seventy Navajos employed to tie carrots. He
demanded mattresses for all workers to sleep on, a wage increase
from twenty-two to twenty-four cents per crate, and a paid police officer to patrol the camp to "insure that if any of them got
drunk they would not wander-into town and be arrested." Finally,
he insisted on nine dollars a day as compensation for his role as
foreman." When the farmers initially refused to grant the pay
increase, Johnson and the rest of the Navajo workers ceased
work. Disturbed, the farmer called the Navajo Service placement
officer to intervene. But Johnson stood his ground. He insisted
that the increase "was necessary in order for them to make a
living wage." Despite his attempt to intervene, the placement officer reported, "Mr. Johnson was very adamant in his demands
that the employer would have to pay the higher rate or he would
take all of the workers back to' the reservation." Much to the
chagrin of other growers in the area, the farmer gave in to
Johnson's demands after less than a twenty-four-hour standoff."
That same month, another group of Navajo agricultural workers in Cucamonga, California, staged a similar collective protest.
On 20 November, Navajos who had been employed to pick lemons walked off the job because the farmers refused to employ
one member of their group, a man the farmers characterized as
"hard of hearing and absentminded." Once again, the farmer called
in the Navajo Service representative to "reason" with the workers. Unlike the Queen Creek incident, however, the Navajos car-

388

OCTOBER 1999

O'NEILL

ried out their threat and returned to the reservation. Either the
farmers hired everyone in the group, or nobody would work."
The BfA as Labor Contractor

While some employers applauded the BIA's efforts to control and
stabilize the Navajo labor supply and attempted to comply with its
suggestions, others were less than enthusiastic. Employers' support for the BIA's policies depended largely on whether they benefited from Navajo migratory strategies. Some commercial growers
balked at the BIA's suggestion that they build permanent communities near their farms. Unwilling to assume the expense or responsibility, these farmers objected to establishing communities
where Navajo workers would live year-round. One Phoenix
grower complained,
Our particular business is seasonal and we have not been
able to figure out a uniform job for this group over the
entire year. We bring them in November and the season
runs until Jurie, but fluctuates during that period .... We
don't know how we can cushion over an entire year, because these people, when the time comes, always want to
go back to the reservation.t"
John M. Jacobs, representing general farming and vegetable
growers in Phoenix, raised the problem of establishing schools
for Navajo children if permanent communities were developed.
He argued that the local schools were resisting enrolling Navajo
students. He pointed out that:
[0]ne of the greatest problems of our camp is trying to
work with the schools in order to get the children into
school. Facilities simply are not set up to take care of these
children in school. That is a problem that will be basic in
your over-all plan of trying to locate these people."
The growers did support a system that would establish offreservation communities (at government expense) from which they
could draw their labor supply. They urged the BIA to create a
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centralized "pooling" station where they could hire employees
according to their labor needs. This, they argued, would solve the
problems they had in recruiting enough laborers.
BIA officials may have had the bracero program in mind when
developing their scheme to relocate Navajos to agricultural labor
camps. The Navajo proposal followed the development of the
bracero system by six years, and in some ways the two programs
were similar. Both programs involved U.S. federal agencies as
labor contractors, supplying agricultural workers to the commercial growers in the West. But the aim of the BIA's program differed considerably from the bracero system. BIA officials hoped
to encourage Navajos to leave their homes for good. The bracero
program, at least officially, expected workers to return to Mexico
after staying in the United States for a limited time. It sought to
benefit Western agricultural interests, while the BIA's program
aimed, at least in theory, to relieve poverty by easing the stress
on reservation resources and to encourage N avaj 0 assimilation
into mainstream American society."
It is unclear whether the BIA was working in tandem with the
Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Labor Department, the two agencies responsible for administering the bracero
program. Whether or not these two programs were officially connected, there is evidence that farmers entertained the idea of replacing Mexican contract workers with Navajos. Yet Navajos'
numbers could not possibly have met the demand for labor supplied by Mexican workers."
Faced with opposition from the farmers, Zeh offered a compromise proposal that abandoned the BIA's ideal of stable, offreservation colonies for centralized and less-than-permanent labor
camps. He argued that it was inefficient for individual growers to
venture out onto the reservation to do their own recruiting. Instead, the BIAwould' hire five Navajo recruiters to canvas the
reservation for available workers. When they found enough candidates to fill the growers' labor orders, the Navajo recruiters
would bring them to a central place to be picked up, One of the
merits of this plan, Zehasserted, was that, for farmers, it would
"eliminate the necessity of going out and beating the bush for
labor. "44 The BIA would not change the labor system that had
been in place since the beginning ofthe century. Its officials would
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simply attempt to take control of it.
The BIA's relationship with railroad recruiters was not as
amiable. Given the choice between placing Navajo workers in
commercial agriculture or in jobs working for the railroad, the
BIA clearly advocated the former. The agency favored agriculture because railroad employment usually only took men on a seasonal basis, encouraging them to leave their wives and children at
home on the reservation. Agricultural work was seasonal as well,
but since commercial growers hired whole families, the BIA saw
the potential for encouraging entire households to leave the reservation for good. The railroad recruiters were also closely affiliated with the reservation trading posts, an institution that some
BIA officials saw as corrupt and exploitative."
Railroad employers were quite s~tisfied with the system they
had in place. Like some of the growers, they opposed creating
permanent off-reservation settlements. They preferred recruiting
their workers when they needed them, primarily in the spring,
summer, and fall, and laying them off in the winter when bad
weather slowed track maintenance. Working through the trader
allowed them an insider's access to the available work force and
a way to identify and keep track of the most reliable workers.
Railroad representatives resented the BIA's bias toward agriculture and argued that their system offered the Navajos more economic benefits, including unemployment insurance, sick pay, and
retirement. 46
Railroad employers presented one of the largest stumbling
blocks for the BIA. After discussing the Navajo labor situation
with Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe officials in Winslow, Arizona,
Lucy Adams, Director of Welfare and Placement .for the Navajo
Service, reported:
It is very difficult to make this individual or any other official of the Santa Fe realize that they should not have a
monopoly on Navajo labor. They are firmly convinced that
since they pioneered in using Navaj 0 labor that henceforth all Navajos should be directed to their uses. They
also believe that the Indians should be kept as a pool on
the reservation during the winter months so that they will
be available for their uses commencing in the Spring."?
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It is not surprising that Western mining companies expressed
the most interest in what the BIA was proposing." Unlike the
agricultural industry and the railroads, mining depended on a
stable, permanent labor force. Some mining companies even offered a number of incentives to married Navajo men and their
families to encourage them to settle down. For example, the superintendent of the Bingham Canyon mine planned to remodel two
old apartment buildings "which, when completed, will provide
modern living quarters to between six and eight families." As long
as the BIA provided the Navajos with trailers, he was even willing "to provide a camp area, level it off with bull-dozers, and provide water, sewage disposal and electricity. "49 In another example,
Phelps Dodge offered to bring a medicine man to Morenci as a
way to stem the tide of workers returning to the reservation. That
effort failed, however, since the medicine men they approached
refused to perform N avaj 0 rituals on land that lay outside the four
sacred mountains.
Despite the efforts of BIA officials, tribal leaders, and Western industrialists, Navajo workers continued to view wages as a
resource to be pooled for the maintenance of the reservation
household. In his 1948 investigation of off-reservation wage work,
Robert Young reported that Navajos working and living in Bingham
Canyon were not committed to settling there on a permanent basis. Even men who had their wives and families with them set
their sights on returning to the reservation. For example, Young
reported that Ab Harris, a Navajo man from Marble Canyon, was
saving fifty dollars from every paycheck, which would soon amount
to two thousand dollars. Despite the good wages, he, his wife,
and three children were living in part of a small, delapidated house
in the ruins of an abandoned underground copper mine near the
Bingham Canyon operation. Instead of using his savings to move
into more comfortable quarters, Harris planned to use the money
to build his' family a stone house on the reservation, a proj ect that
he estimated would require twenty days in the upcoming year to
complete. When the house was finished, he expected to continue
working at Bingham Canyon to raise more money so that he could
build a .filling station on the highway nearby. 50
For BIA officials, the small mining community in Rico, Colorado, seemed to provide an ideal model for off-reservation Na-

392

OCTOBER 1999

O'NEILL

vajo colonies. Rico was a typical company town that experienced
cycles of boom and bust from the 1920s through the 1950s. At its
height in 1954, the community reached a population of seven hundred people, 35 percent of whom were Navajos. Located 93 miles
north of Shiprock and connected to the reservation by u.s. Highway 666 and Colorado State Highway 145, it was within easy
reach of Navajo workers. Unlike railroad work and commercial
agriculture, mining offered year-round work for wages that would
support a standard of living above the poverty line for families
residing off the reservation. Ralph Luebben, an anthropologist who
conducted a participant-observer study of the Rico Navajos, noted
that the mining company paid relatively high wages. He reported
that between July 1953 and June 1954, seventy-five Navajo miners employed by the Argentine Mining company in Rico earned
$116,209.08, or an average of $1,549.46 per man, just above the
minimum government officials had determined would allow a Navajo man to support himself and his immediate family."
In addition to offering relatively high wages and employment
year-round, the mining company offered better housing than other
Southwestern industries that employed Navajos. Company housing was by no means luxurious, but in comparison to the migrant
agricultural camps where workers would be lucky if the growers
provided them with tents and cooking stoves, the Rico facilities
were an improvement.F
Housing was better than what Navajos would find on commercial farms, but it was worse than what the mining company
provided Anglo miners and their families. The Navajo homes were
clustered around a common sanitary facility that included central
washing places, toilets, and showers. Families living in houses
without inside cold water taps had to rely on wells, a fire hydrant,
and the water overflow of the nearby Atlantic Cable mine." In
contrast, Anglos living in company housing enjoyed hot water and
indoor, private toilets and bathing facilities." To make matters
worse, the mining company paid Navajo workers less than Anglo
miners performing the same work. Such racial discrimination was
an all-too-familiar pattern. Rico was just like any other reservation border town.
Despite these difficulties, the high wages Navajos could earn
in Rico made it one of the best options available to them off the
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reservation. Jobs at Rico paid better than what a man could earn
working in the reservation mines, on the railroad, or in commercial agriculture. It was also one of the few places where workers
could bring their wives and children."
The Draw of the Reservation Household
Much to the chagrin of BIA officials, Navajo workers treated
working in the mines like any other off-reservation job. Navajo
miners did not view their jobs as permanent. On the average, they
worked about four months at a time and returned to the reservation to check on their families, tend to household responsibilities,
or participate in Navajo ceremonials or curing sings. Despite the
possibility of earning as much as five thousand dollars a year,
most Navajos refused to work for more than a few months at a
time. Family and ritual obligations consistently drew them back
horne ."
Despite frequent warnings from mining company officials,
Navajo mine workers would leave work when pressing matters
on the reservation needed their attention. Luebben calculated that
Navajos missed twice as many shifts as Anglo workers, the highest rate of absenteeism occurring in the month of the Shiprock
fair and during the Gallup ceremonial. They also missed a high
percentage of shifts in April to return to the reservation to prepare their farm plots for spring planting. 57 One Navajo miner explained to Luebben in a matter-of-fact way, "I'll go down on
weekends and farm. Once a month I'll have to take off on Friday
evening to get two days of farming.":"
Navajo absenteeism was so bad that mining company officials complained that it undermined their operation. But despite
efforts to carry out disciplinary actions, Navajo workers refused
to change their priorities. The company geologist explained to
Luebben:
I fired a few [for failing to make the shift]. I did it before,
but it didn't do any good. They're not on the job as much
as I'd like to have them .... What I need is a crew of
about 55, with half off and half on. I don't know what
would happen if they all showed Up.59
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Luebben argued that this behavior indicated "that Navahos
[were] interested primarily in short terms of employment and a
subsequent temporary monetary income." Interpreting high absenteeism and turnover as their reluctance to identify as permanent wage workers, he concluded that "[t]o most Navahos mining
is just another job and their occupational position does not mean
economic security nor does it define their status. "60 With the type
of discrimination they faced in Rico, it is no surprise that Navajos
did not want to make it their permanent home.
The wages they brought home from their off-reservation jobs
allowed Navajo workers to maintain their household-centered
survival strategies and to navigate the changing political and economic climate on the reservation with increasing flexibility. With
the money they earned working on the railroads, in commercial
agriculture, or in mining operations, many Navajos achieved relative autonomy from the traders and developed the means to maintain migratory strategies on their own terms. By the early 1950s,
with the federal government building roads with money allocated
from the Navajo-Hopi Rehabilitation Act, consumer and wage
markets were becoming more accessible to reservation households. With the new roads, wages, and an increased demand for
goods that could be acquired off the reservation, trucks and cars
quickly replaced the horse and wagon as the main means of transportation. Owning a truck allowed Navajos to bypass the trader
and purchase food and consumer goods in grocery and department stores located in places like Gallup and Flagstaff.
By purchasing trucks with the very wages they were earning
from working in the fields, agricultural workers established a stronger bargaining position for themselves with farm labor recruiters.
Driving to the fields in their own vehicles allowed them more freedom to come and go as they pleased, and easier access to return
. to the reservation at a moment's notice. While growers were relieved to some extent by the reduced cost of transporting Navajo
workers back and forth to the reservation, they lamented the problem that increased mobility caused for maintaining a stable work
force and for controlling the Navajos' behavior in the labor camps.
A Navajo Service representative complained,
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To the grower, this increase of cars is a mixed blessing.
Though he.is not responsible for transportation, the worker
is more likely to leave without notice or go into town and
get drunk. It has also meant this summer that workers are
arriving a week or more before the jobs start, and have to
apply to local merchants for credit which they are reluctant to extend."
Clarence and Margaret Kee might have been among those
Navajo workers who worried Western employers. They traced
the lineage of their cars and trucks, like their sheep, back to the
first two vehicles they purchased with the wages they earned
working on the railroad and in the fields.'? The wages that
Clarence Kee sent home from his job on the railroad bought his
mother her first truck. A few years later, Margaret Kee and her
adolescent son went to work picking potatoes and sugar beets in
Idaho. When they had enough money, they purchased a small car
and returned to their reservation home near Window Rock, Arizona. Wage work provided the resources that brought them back
to the reservation; it did not encourage them to move away for
good.
As much as the Navajo Service hated to admit it, the bureaucrats had not been successful in stemming the tide of return migration. Some Navajos did permanently leave the reservation, but
many more came back. In 1953, approximately 375 people left
the reservation for long-term employment and relocation purposes.
In 1955,415 people moved to Chicago, Denver, Los Angeles, and
San Francisco, where the BIA had field offices to assist those
relocating. In January 1956, five hundred more applications were
on file. 63 However, approximately 30 percent of those who left
with the aim of relocating on a permanent basis returned to the
reservation. Compilers of the report detailing the progress of the
1950 Navajo-Hopi Rehabilitation Act noted that the Indians returned because they were "unable to adjust to changing living
conditions" and because of "family ties on the Reservation. "64
In contrast, by 1953 the Railroad Retirement Board, the BIA's
Branch of Placement and Relocation in Window Rock, and state
employment services in Arizona and New Mexico reported 23,500
seasonal, off-reservation placements. The difference between the
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number of placements and the number of people relocating in 1953
suggests that Navajo seasonal migratory strategies persisted. In
1962, responding to a Congressional inquiry on Indian unemployment, Glen R. Landbloom, General Superintendent of the Navajo
Service, admitted, "in spite of the interest of the Navajo people
toward economic life, the effects of Indian culture still exist."
Landbloom confirmed what commercial growers and railroad employers already knew, that Navajos "still prefer to work at employment which enables them to take part in the numerous tribal
ceremonies. "65
Conclusion
The struggle over relocation amounted to a battle over what would
constitute the Navajo household in the postwar era. BIA officials
wanted to transform extended, kin-based residential groups into
nuclear households off the reservation. They hoped Navajos would
leave their hogans and become village dwellers and limit their kin
obligations to what was customary for an Anglo-style nuclear
family. Navajo men and women participated in those BIA programs but did not accept the ultimate goals of colonization. Instead, in an effort to keep their reservation households intact, they
treated those "opportunities"-even jobs that offered them more
money and permanent year-round employment-as one more
source of income that would allow them to maintain a broader,
kinship-centered lifestyle on the reservation. The reservation
household provided Navajos with a cultural buffer, offering them
relief from the hostile racial environment that many Navajos experienced in reservation border towns like Rico, Colorado. When
Navajos refused to relinquish that space, the BIA's plan failed.
What had begun as a grand plan to reconstitute the Navajo household off the reservation provided, in the end, a way for the BIA
to assume the role of glorified labor contractor for Southwestern
agricultural interests.
The Navajo experience is similar to what some historians have
found in parts of Latin America and Africa. Florencia Mallon's
effort to "put flesh on the bones of that skeleton historians call
the 'development of capitalism'" reveals that Andean peasants
used "traditional relationships" to shape the transition of their vil-
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lages to a capitalist economy." In the process, those "weapons
of the weak" transformed the villagers and their communities.
Like members of the Navajo Tribal Councilor other Navajo elites
who utilized kinship networks and connections with traders to
become labor contractors, wealthier peasants in the Yanamarca
Valley drew on their influence at the village level to fashion' a
system of wage-based, commercial agriculture from a kinshipbased system.
Navajo wage-work strategies also parallel what Keletso
Atkins found in South Africa. From their experience performing
agricultural labor in their own village communities, the Natal Africans defined a fair day's work as beginning at sunup and ending
at sundown, and kept track of their wages and work days on a
lunar cycle. British officials who attempted to impose rationalized time regimes were dismayed when the workers appeared
before them and demanded: "The moon is dead! Give us our
money!" Those officials who did not conform or at least adjust to
the Zulu work ethic were subject to labor shortages."
Working for wages in the Navajo way was a form of contestation over the labor process itself. The N avaj 0 workers defined
the terms of employment when they refused to work longer than
four months at a time and left their jobs for ceremonials and to
tend to familial obligations. Holding on to the land and maintaining the reservation household, however symbolic, gave them a
means to negotiate the terms of work. Like the British colonial
officials who wanted to ensure their supply of laborers in South
Africa, Southwestern entrepreneurs who planned to employ Navajos had to learn their workers' ways of doing things. Shrewd
employers did just that. The BIA failed to implement the Navajo
colonization program because farmers and railroad officials refused to endorse the plan. Those employers favored the system
they had in place because it was in their economic interest to
exploit the household-centered cultural practices that the Navajo
had developed in the post-stock-reduction period. Resisting permanent relocation and refusing to conform to the BIA's expectations, Navajos made a place for themselves in the Southwestern
labor market. They participated in that market but did not ernbrace the assimilationist goals that BIA officials and some employerspromoted.
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Navajos did leave the reservation to find jobs. But, for many
like the Kees, ,that work provided them with the resources they
needed to preserve, rather than replace their reservation households.
Margaret Kee now lives in St. Michaels, Arizona, in a house
equipped with all the modern conveniences. Her daughters' mobile homes surround her comfortable home like hogans clustered
around the family settlement in the days of her youth. She spends
most of her time weaving rugs and tending her sheep while
Clarence works at the Pittsburgh and Midway strip mine a few
miles east, near Window Rock.
Even though Margaret Kee no longer relies on the sheep for
her living, they remain central to her sense of well-being. As her
daughter Juanita Brown explains, "[I]f the sheep are not around
her, she feels empty ... so she has to have some kind of sheep
around her ... they're holding that gift from their dad and their
mom to this day." For Margaret, sheep were (and are) more than
a source of income. They embody a sense of connection with
past and future generations, a way to pass on the lessons her
father taught her. Translating her mother's story from Navajo to
English, Brown explained, "He constantly ... remind[ ed] these
two to take care of [the] sheep .... Take good care of them. In
the future ... when you guys have kids ... tell them about the
sheep .... Let them go on with the sheep.?"
Like the Kees, Burton Yazzie, a coworker of Clarence Kee's
at the P&M Mine and fifteen years his junior, learned that the
sheep represented security for the future. "We had to take care
of them, and they would take care of you. Vice versa."?" Even
today, when sheep contribute little in terms of household income,
Navajos still invest them with deep emotionaland spiritual significance. As one daughter of a miner employed at Peabody Coal
Company on Black Mesa explained, "the sheep are our culture."?"
The Navajo case demonstrates that the development of capitalism includes, as Kathy Le Mons Walker suggests, "multiple
constructions with different and even conflicting principles and
histories.v'tThose stories certainly promise to complicate the
master narrative of U.S. economic development, a positivist tale
that continues to dominate western historical thinking. As that
myth unravels, perhaps the reign of U.S. exceptional ism, a fable
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that features "the West" as its central drama, will fade as well.
The significance of the N avaj 0 example thus becomes more than
filling in the gaps in the historical record. Writing about capitalist
development in a way that includes Native Americans as historical agents requires pushing past the discourse of development to
incorporate alternative visions. Understanding the multiple strands
of economic development in the past may help us imagine alternative models for the present and the future. The values and cultural ethics developed by Navajos and other indigenous cultures
might offer creative possibilities.
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